An Army of Sikhs
Photo by Chander Mohan on Unsplash
Photo par Chander Mohan sur Unsplash
Arjun Singh
(FR) Cet article suit la croissance de la diaspora sikhe au Canada et par conséquent la formation d’un groupe de pression sur la politique fédérale qui a pour capacité d’influencer les prises de décisions politiques en accord avec leurs intérêts. À titre d’étude de cas, il examine l’impact de la diaspora sur les relations internationales du Canada avec l’Inde — marquées par le soutien du mouvement séparatiste du Khalistan. Cet article souligne l’influence des sentiments pro-Khalistan de la diaspora sur les relations entre ces deux pays, ainsi que l’effet inverse sur les priorités canadiennes de sécurité publique et de sentiment d’unité nationale. Ceci illustre donc les conséquences disproportionnées de l’engagement politique d’une minorité au sein des systèmes fédéraux et parlementaires du Canada.
How has the Sikh diaspora’s support for the Khalistan movement in India impacted Canada’s foreign policy and the pursuit of its national interests?
Introduction
This essay will evaluate how the support for the Khalistan movement in India within the Sikh diaspora has impacted Canada’s foreign policy. It will analyze domestic mechanisms used by Sikhs to cause such impacts and argue that they have been detrimental to Canadian foreign policy and national interests. Additionally, it will consider limitations on such influence and the extent to which the Sikh diaspora’s efforts undercut their priorities. Finally, it will evaluate observations about the Canadian political system arising from such influence.
On April 9th, 1867, ten days after the British North America Act received Royal Assent, John A. Macdonald wrote a letter to English jurist Henry Maine. Amidst his reflections on the new Confederation, Macdonald described problems it would face – chiefly, a military threat from the United States owing to desires of hinterland expansion. On this, Macdonald wrote memorably that “war will come someday between England and the United States, and India can do us Yeoman's service by sending an army of Sikhs” (Lackner 2006).
While war never came, the Sikhs did. Since the arrival of the first Sikh immigrants in 1902 (Sahoo and Sangha 2010, 83), the Sikh population in Canada – fuelled by high rates of birth and immigration within the community – has grown to nearly 500,000 people at present (Shahed 2019, 330). Throughout this period, while comprising a fraction of the national population, they have achieved a high degree of influence within Canada’s political system. Jagmeet Singh, born to Sikh immigrants, became the first visible minority leader of a federal political party in 2017, while Ujjal Dosanjh served as Premier of British Columbia from 2000 to 2001 (Shahed 2019, 331). In Canadian history, eight Federal Ministers have been Sikhs – the largest of any visible minority group – while eighteen Sikhs currently serve in Parliament across the Liberal, Conservative, and New Democratic parties. Such visibility and participation – particularly, beyond other numerically larger groups, such as the Chinese diaspora – has led to the Sikhs’ identification as a “mature” immigrant community (Matheson 2006, 37).
Alongside their integration into Canada, the Sikhs have maintained “sentimental or material links with [their] land of origin” extending to political developments in their native Punjab (Singh and Singh 2008, 154). Most consequential among them is their affiliation with the ‘Khalistan’ movement – an Indian separatist effort seeking to create a sovereign state in the territory of Punjab. Since 1971, the Canadian Sikh diaspora has been “actively involved” in the movement through advocacy and the funding of pro-Khalistan militias engaged in an armed insurrection against India (Shahed 2019, 329). While the movement lost domestic support in India during the 1990s, it has remained popular among Canadian Sikhs who have since assumed the “planning, fundraising and execution” of its activities (Razavy 2006, 80). This has included efforts to influence Canadian foreign policy, particularly towards India, which Sikhs seek to use to support their Khalistan aspirations (Shahed 2019, 334). As the diaspora continues to gain political influence, its ability to support the movement using the Canadian state apparatus grows further, impacting Canada’s bilateral relationship with India, counter-terrorism objectives, and even national unity, vis-à-vis separatism in Québec (Riddel-Dixon 2008, 38).
The Khalsa Political Machine
To influence policy, a diaspora must integrate politically with its host country while preventing cultural assimilation within the same. Assimilation, or high acceptance of the host country’s culture at the cost of original identities, would preclude such identities’ (i.e. Sikh identities) influence over political activity (Chand 2014, 288).
In this regard, the Sikh diaspora has been successful in preventing its assimilation while simultaneously expanding its political participation in Canada. This has largely been due to the regionalism of the community, which has concentrated its settlement in select municipalities – the largest of which are Surrey, BC; Brampton, ON; Abbotsford, BC and Calgary, AB (Singh and Singh 2008, 159). Such concentration has ensured that Sikhs constantly interact with each other along ethnoreligious lines (e.g. attending a Gurudwara, speaking Punjabi, and forming connections with other Sikhs) which continuously reinforces their Sikh identity. Importantly, this has ensured second-generation Sikhs (i.e. those born in Canada with no lived experiences in India) may identify with elements of Sikhism and be influenced by Sikh political issues (Singh and Singh 2008, 155). Ensuring such diasporic integrity is a predicate for domestic methods Sikhs use to affect Canadian policy in line with pro-Khalistan objectives.
Foremost among these has been the seeking of political office by Sikhs (whose success is as aforementioned), as well as the diaspora’s support for non-Sikh candidates with ideological congruity (Sahoo and Sangha 2010, 91). Once elected, politicians are expected to use their offices to influence policy per the community’s objectives – i.e. via committee assignments, ministerial roles, as well as private members’ bills (Riddel-Dixon 2008, 40). Underlying such influence has been the diaspora’s robust system of grassroots organizing through local Gurudwaras (i.e. Sikh temples) – a majority of which are pro-Khalistan (Razavy 2006, 85) – to support chosen candidates (Matheson 2006, 28). A candidate’s backing from the Gurudwara leadership enables them to usually gain the support of “40-50 extended families” who attend its religious proceedings (Todd 2019). These families’ support is assured via patriarchal social structures, where the eldest males influence voting patterns of family members, as well as caste congruity, with the support of caste leaders serving as a marker of trust in a candidate (Todd 2019). These networks are crucial when seeking party nominations from a riding or during leadership races where they are used to sell party memberships and fundraise. The New Democratic Party Leadership Election of 2017 – where Jagmeet Singh heavily utilized such networks – is a recent example of the electoral influence held by Gurudwaras, who also played a role in Jean Chrétien’s election as Liberal Party leader in 1990 (Purewal 2011, 1138).
As a corollary, the Sikh community’s numerical strength, coupled with concentrated settlement patterns, has enhanced their ability to play a decisive role in general elections. The high concentration of Sikhs in regions with a large number of House of Commons Seats – i.e. the Greater Toronto Area and Greater Vancouver region (Chand 2014, 291) – indicate such influence. Currently, nine federal ridings across Canada have a majority Sikh population, with eleven holding sizeable numbers of Sikhs (Todd 2019), making support from the community often essential for obtaining a parliamentary majority.
Apart from electoral mobilization, the Sikh community has extended its influence through civil efforts. These efforts can be seen through the formation of associations such as the World Sikh Organization, Sikhs for Justice, and the International Sikh Youth Federation, whose Canadian units have lobbied the federal government in support of the Khalistan movement (Razavy 2006, 83). Such influence is further gained through community initiatives organized under the Sikh banner, such as food banks or Langars and Vaisakhi celebrations, which are free of cost and open to all demographic groups (Shahed 2019, 331). These initiatives foster public endearment for the Sikh community – whereby Sikhs are associated with values of charity, selflessness, and hospitality – which supports the political success of Sikh candidates and creates perceptions of political clout as they lobby federal officials (P. Singh 2018, 266-267).
“Vive le Khalistan libre!”
Through these mechanisms, the Sikh diaspora has ensured successive Canadian governments adopt a cautious approach to foreign relations on matters connected to the Khalistan Movement, which does not impugn the movement’s objectives. The approach has had a three-fold impact on Canadian foreign policy: negatively affecting its bilateral relationship with India as well as core national interests of citizen security and national unity.
Among these, the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship has borne the greatest impact. Since 1982, India has frequently complained about civil Khalistan activism by the diaspora in Canada, which the Federal Government – due to both political considerations and §2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (permitting free expression and association) – has been unwilling to prevent (Shahed 2019, 336-337). The result has been a climate of suspicion in the relationship wherein India views Canada as acquiescent of threats to its territorial integrity. Such suspicion has been deepened by the visibility of pro-Khalistan sentiments in federal politics – which are the result of Sikh diaspora influence. A parliamentary motion in 2010 by two Liberal MPs to recognize anti-Sikh riots in India as a “genocide,” then-Opposition Leader Tom Mulcair's declaration of a 1984 Indian Army operation against Khalistan separatists as an "invasion," and NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh’s election (whose pro-Khalistan views led to his declaration as “persona non grata” by the Indian Government) are examples of pro-Khalistan sentiments being latent in Canada’s political system and give credence to Indian suspicion (Singh and Singh 2008, 161). More significant, however, has been the perceived inaction by Canada to address acts of Khalistan terrorism – specifically the 1985 ‘Kanishka’ bombing of Air India Flight 182 by Babbar Khalsa International, a Sikh terrorist group operating in British Columbia (Granatstein 2008, 82). Canada’s refusal to extradite lead perpetrator Talwinder Parmar (whose extradition was opposed by diaspora) and the delayed inquiry into the incident (launched 21 years later, in 2006) have further conveyed Canada’s unwillingness to address threats to Indian security due to domestic political pressures (Purewal 2011, 1135).
In policy terms, such suspicion has precluded cooperation between both states on bilateral portfolios – including issues of energy and trade – due to political animus (Metha 2019, 3). Additionally, it has disrupted diplomatic visits by officials to each other’s countries; most notably, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s visit to India in 2018. During the visit, Trudeau was accorded an “unfriendly reception” by Indian officials and frequently questioned on the separatist views of his Cabinet’s Sikh members to the extent that Canada accused the Indian Government of “undermining” his visit, further disturbing bilateral relations (Shahed 2019, 337). In Canada, visiting Indian officials have been subject to similarly hostile receptions from the Sikh diaspora, such as in the 2010 Kamal Nath (an anti-Khalistan politician) visit and the cancellation of incumbent Punjab Chief Minister Amarinder Singh’s trip to Canada in 2017 (Singh and Singh 2008, 160). Moreover, such hostility has percolated to consular matters, where Indian diplomats have been banned by Gurudwaras from attending their proceedings in Canada (Metha 2019, 16) and Canadians with suspected ties to Sikh separatists were denied Indian visas to visit Punjab (Shahed 2019, 339). The creation of “unofficial consulates” by the Shiromani Akali Dal (a formerly separatist political party) in Ottawa, Vancouver, and Toronto – which India, considering them pretender diplomatic missions, unsuccessfully pressed Canada to limit – further strained ties based on consular matters (Singh and Singh 2008, 158). Consequently, the agglomeration of such events has fractured Canada’s foreign policy towards India – the largest contributor to its immigrant population (Statistics Canada 2016) and a strategic counterweight to geopolitical rival, China – which the Trudeau Government identified as a foreign policy priority in 2015 (Metha 2019, 12).
Beyond bilateral matters, the Sikh diaspora’s pro-Khalistan influence has affected Canada’s pursuit of its core national interests through foreign policy – specifically, ensuring “the security of Canadians” and the “maintenance of national unity” (Granatstein 2008, 79-80). Concerning the first of these, the Government's unwillingness to address Canada-based Khalistan terrorism places Canadian citizens at risk of harm from terrorist acts; the aforementioned Kanishka bombing (occurring in Irish airspace) caused the death of 268 Canadian passengers (CBC News 2005). Moreover, Khalistan terrorists have previously engaged in violent activity on Canadian soil – such as in the murder of a Crown prosecution witness set to testify in the Air India bombing trial of 1998, and an assassination attempt on Premier Ujjal Dosanjh (Razavy 2006, 333-334). These instances demonstrate the potential for Canadians to be harmed by pro-Khalistan activities in Canada and abroad which, by not addressing actively, the Federal Government unwillingly facilitates. To this end, the Federal Government’s decision to strike references to Sikh separatism from the “2018 Public Report on the Terrorism Threat to Canada” (Public Safety Canada 2019) lend credence to claims of its reluctance to robustly address the threat Canada-based Khalistan separatism poses to Canadians and, thus, to fulfil a core national interest.
Additionally, the Canadian Government’s equivocation on Sikh separatism serves to undermine its position on national unity in Canada concerning Québécois nationalism. The Québécois nationalist demands for an independent nation-state based on ethnolinguistic differences is analogous to that of the Khalistan movement in India (Riddel-Dixon 2008, 38) with Canada’s opposition to the former being incongruous with its acquiescence of the latter. In this regard, Canada’s tolerance of Khalistan sentiments in its foreign relations may hamper its resistance to Québécois nationalism, which has begun to find supporters in the Sikh diaspora, as evident with Jagmeet Singh’s demand for “self-determination” in both regions (Forest 2018).
The Canadian Reprisal
While the Sikh diaspora may seek to exert its influence in Canada towards pro-Khalistan objectives, three factors serve to mitigate such an impact on Canadian foreign policy.
The first involves the relative priority of interests within the Sikh community – where immigration concerns are considered more pressing than separatism (Riddel-Dixon 2008, 34). To this end, the Sikh community has sought to lobby the government for liberalization of immigration norms to ensure the admissibility of relatives from India and, in allocating political capital, has prioritised the issue over pro-Khalistan advocacy (Singh and Singh 2008, 163). That such prioritization has occurred as the Khalistan movement ostensibly loses momentum in India suggests support for Sikh separatism may be receding among the diaspora (Purewal 2011, 1141). This loss of support gives the Federal Government political freedom to oppose the movement and to improve bilateral relations with India. Nevertheless, Canada’s Refugee Claims Admission Report for 2018 reports a 246% increase in Indian asylum claims, a majority of which are Sikh youth citing political persecution, suggesting that separatism may be latent in India (Ivison 2018). In this regard, the admission of such refugees, as well as further Sikh immigration, may thus bolster Khalistan sentiments in Canada by adding supporters to the diaspora ranks, thereby further constraining foreign policy.
Regardless of sentiment strength, the structural factors in the Canadian political system limit the influence of the Sikh community on the foreign policy process. The political system’s evolution towards a centralized structure, where the Prime Minister and Cabinet dominate policymaking (Savoie 1999, 663), reduce the ability of pro-Khalistan actors to substantially limit foreign policy beyond statements and symbolic legislation. While such limitations affect legislators per se, they do not diminish political concerns of the government leadership which – in seeking to maintain support – will respond to concerns of key constituencies, often taking cues from legislators representing them. Such responsiveness by government leaders maintains the influence held by the Sikh diaspora.
Furthermore, efforts to channel pro-Khalistan tendencies through the Canadian state may have the unintended effect of hampering the Sikh diaspora’s separatist objectives due to the visibility such efforts create. By exerting Khalistan demands on Canadian foreign policy, the diaspora effectively identifies the separatist elements (i.e. organisations and individuals) among itself which may be subject to limitation by the Canadian Government. This process has limited the activities of pro-Khalistan associations such as the Babbar Khalsa International and International Sikh Youth Federation, both of which have been banned and designated as terrorist organisations (Public Safety Canada 2003). However, such efforts are limited in their application to the locus of pro-Khalistan sentiment in Canada. Gurudwaras, with their aforementioned political influence and religious sensitivity to the Sikh community, prevent the Government from taking substantial action.
Conclusion
From the aforementioned evaluation, it is clear that the Sikh diaspora has significantly impacted Canada’s foreign policy and national interests in support of the Khalistan movement. Its influence, chiefly electoral, compels the Federal Government to exercise restraint when addressing the movement or limiting its terrorist activity even when Canadians citizens are its targets (as demonstrated in the Kanishka bombing). Moreover, it has curtailed and strained existing bilateral ties between India and Canada despite strategic imperatives that demand closer engagement.
To this end, the Sikh diaspora serves as a prime example of Canadian foreign policy being affected by domestic political considerations. Moreover, that the Sikhs, a numerically small community within the Canadian populace inhabiting limited regions, would have such an effect is remarkable and serves to illustrate how highly concentrated and ideologically cohesive interest groups may exercise significant influence in Canada’s political system.